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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLORENCE SCHWEITZER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
HARVEY srrONE, S & I TRUCKING CO., 
A corp., et al, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
I. 
THE APPEAL 
rl.,his is an appeal from a judgment of the Third 
District Court, Su1nn1it County, Judge A. H. Ellett pre-
siding, tried to a jury. 
II. 
srrATE,~IENT OF FACTS 
On April 20, 1957, Harvey Stone, an employee of 
the S & I Trucking Company, was driving a truck and 
trailer of that co1npany loaded \vith drilling 1nud. lie 
and t\vo other S & I drivers had loaded their trucks 
in Salt Lake City earlier that day, and \vere driving 
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eastward on U. S. 30s toward Evanston, Wyoming. 
Late that evening, the three S & I Trucks were approach-
ing a hill, or incline, about 16.7 miles east of Echo 
Junction. ~L\.t this point the road becon1es three-lane 
with two lanes going uphill, or east-vvard, and one lane 
downhill or Westward (Ex H-20 and H-13). 
Approaching this hill Stone atte1npted to pass the 
lead truck, and while passing in the center lane his 
engine stalled ( Tr. 75). Stone coasted uphill and as 
far as possible to the right until his truck stopped. (Tr. 
78). 
The last S & I Truck, driven by I van Sh·effy, passed 
Stone's truck on the left without crossing the center line 
and parked 400 or 500 feet farther up the highway 
(Tr. 259, 260). Sheffy parked his truck as far to the 
right as he could, set the brakes, left the headlights 
on low beam and the clearance lights on, the turn in-
dicator blinking, and proceeded back to Stone's truck 
to see if he could be of help. (Tr. 261). 
In the 1neantime, Stone turned off his headlights, 
leaving his clearance lights, taillights and brake lights 
on (Tr. 263, 353). He believed he had run out of gas, 
had switched to the auxiliary tank and \vas trying to 
start the engine. ( Tr. 76, 265). Innnediately theteafter 
a Western Auto Transport Truck loaded with new 
pickups and driven by Lloyd V. Higginbotha1n, s1nashed 
into the rear of the S & I Truck. Neither Stone nor 
Sh·effy savv or heard the approach of the Western Auto 
Transport Truck. 
11he in1pact of the collision rnoved the Stone truck 
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ahead 21 feet ( 1_.,r. 142) and thre'v a pickup truck frorn 
the Western Auto Transport onto the road in the west 
hound lane of traffie. The collision put out all the 
light~ on both the Western Auto Transport Truck and 
the S & I Truck. (Tr. 77). Stone and Higginbotham had 
just succeeded in getting out of their wrecked trucks, 
and Sheffy had gotten up frorn where he had been 
thrown, \vhen a car driven by John Schweitzer and 
oceupied by his wife, Florence Schweitzer, came west-
\Vard over the crest of the hill. 
The scene of the collision is clearly visible for 8/10 
of a n1ile to the west, and over 900 feet to the east (Pre-
trial order, Ex H-13, H-16). Schweitzer testified he 
\Vas driving at 45 to 50 1n.p.h.; that when he came over 
the crest of the hill a set of bright lights from a station-
ary vehicle on the road shone in his eyes ; that he let his 
foot off the gas, touched the brake and put his own 
lights on di1n; that he couldn't see a thing beyond the 
lights; that as he passed the stationary vehicle lre put 
his O\vn lights on bright and for the first time saw the 
\vrecked vehicles ahead; that he then applied his brakes 
and turned to the left, 1nissing the pickup and crashed 
into the two \vrecked trucks, having left 123 feet of skid 
1narks. (Tr. 16-21, 143, Ex. H-13) . 
• 
He further testified that but for the lights in his 
eyes, he could have stopped in ti1ne to avoid the collis-
ion. ( Tr. 42) 
As a result of injuries received in this collision, 
Florence Schweitzer sued Harvey Stone, S & I Truck-
ing Con1pany, Lloyd V. Higginbothan1, Fred Sullivan 
and \\:'"estern Auto Transport Co1npany. In the course 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the trial of the case, at Coalville, Utah, Oct. 26, 27, 
28 and 29, 1959, Lloyd V. Higginbotham, Fred Sullivan 
and Western Auto Transport Company settled with 
her for $10,000.00, the jury returned a verdict upon 
special interrogations finding both Lloyd V. Higgin-
botham and Harvey Stone to be negligent, and a proxi-
mate cause of her injuries, and that she suffered dan1-
ages of $23,000.00. Fro1n this finding, judgn1ent was 
entered in favor of Florence Sch,veitzer and against 
Harvey Stone and S & I Trucking Co1npany for $13,000, 
and it is from this judg1nent the appeal is taken. 
III. 
STATE~MENT OF POINTS 
I. The lower court erred in refusing to instruct 
the jury in accordance with Appellant's requested in-
struction number two. 
II. The lower court erred in refusing to instruct 
the jury in accordance with Appellant's requested in-
struction number four. 
III. The lower court erred in the forn1 of the 
questions in the special verdict submitted to the jury. 
IV. Counsel for Respondent com1nitted prejudic-
ial error in presenting a mathematical per diem formula 
to the jury. 
IV. 
ARGU~IENT 
POINT I. 
T'I-IIC LOWER COlTRT ERRED IN R,EFl~SING 
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1,0 INSTRUCT THE J1JRY IN ACCORDANCE 
\VlrrH 1\ PPELLANT'S RIDQUESTED INSTRUCT-
ION NlT~1BER TWO. 
POINT II. 
rrHE LOWER t\)T~RT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO INS'rRUCT THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH APPELLLANT'S REQUE,STED INSTRUCT-
ION NUlVIBER FOUR. 
Because the tvvo requested instructions are nearly 
identical, we 'vill consider both points together. The 
refused instructions are as follows : 
No. 2 (R. 65) 
"You are instructed that the driver of the 
Western Auto Transport Truck vvas negligent a~ 
a matter of la,v, and if you find that he observed 
the stopped S & I Truck upon the highway or 
under the circurnstances should have observed 
said S & I truck, but because of his neglig'ence 
failed to do so in tin1e to avoid the accident, then 
you are instructed that the negligence on his part 
was the sole proximate cause of the collision be-
tween the Western Auto Truck and the S & I 
truck, and your verdict n1ust be in favor of de-
fendants Harvey Stone and S & I Trucking Conl-
pany, and against Florence Schweitzer, Fred Sul-
livan, Lloyd V. Higginbotham and Western _A_ uto 
Transport Company in their clairns against 
Harvey Stone and S & I Trucking Co1npany, and 
you will further find in favor of HarvP~'" Stone, 
Ivan Sheffy and S & I Trucking Co111pany, and 
against Lloyd V. Higginbotha1n and \\Tpstcrn 
Auto Transport Company, and return verdicts 
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therefor in accordance with the instruction on 
damages hereinafter given you." 
No. 4 (R. 64) 
"You are instructed that the driver of the 
the ·schweitzer car was negligent as a matter 
of law, and if you find that he observed the 
hazards, if any, of the stopped vehicles upon the 
highway or under the circun1stances should have 
observed said vehicles, but because of his negli-
gence failed to do so in time to avoid the collision, 
then you are instructed that the negligence on his 
part was the sole proximate cause of the collision, 
and your verdict must be in favor of the defend-
ants and against plaintiff Florence Schweitzer, no 
caus·e of action." 
Addressing ourselves first to the situation of Hig-
ginbotham, driver of the Western Auto Transport Truck, 
it is undisputed there was 8/10 of a 1nile unobstructed 
vision to the stalled S & I Truck as Higginbotha1n ap-
proached fron1 the west. Higginbotham had his lights 
on, and there was no on-con1ing traffic to interfere \vith 
his vision. He testified he did not see the S & I truck 
until he was 70 feet away (Tr. 93) when it was too late 
to avoid the collision. 
The conflicts in the evidence here centered around 
two items : Whether or not there were lights on the 
S & I Truck, and whether th·e S & I Truck \vas partially 
into the center lane of traffic or entirely on the outside 
lane. These 1natters go to the negligence of Stone, and 
not I-Iigginbothan1, for Higginbotha1n is guilty of negli-
gence as a Inatter of la\v \Vhether the S & I Truck was 
unlighted (Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co., 
80 U 331, 15 P 2nd 309) or lighted (Hirschbach Y. 
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Dubuque Packing Co., 7U 2nd 7, 316 P 2 319). 
This court has recently approved this requested in-
struction in Mclll1trdie v. Underwood, 9 U2 400, 346 P 2 
711, quoting with approval frorn Hillyard v. Utah By-
Products Co., 1 U 2nd 143, 263 P 2nd 287. Thes·e cases 
draw the distinction bet\veen two situations: 
''The first situation is where one has negli-
gently created a dangerous condition (such as 
parking the truck) and a later actor observed, 
or circumstances are such that he could not fail 
to observe, but negligently failed to avoid it. 
The second situation involves conduct of a later 
intervening actor who negligently failed to ob-
serve the dangerous condition until it was too late 
to avoid it. In regard to the first situation it is 
held as a rnatter of law that the later intervening 
act does interrupt the natural sequence of events 
and cut off the legal effect of the negligence of 
the initial actor." 
Certainly under these circumstances, requested in-
struction Nurnber Two was proper and its refusal was 
prejudicial to appellant. There is a jury question pre-
sented, as to whether Higginbotham (with 8/10 of a 
1nile unobstructed vision) observed the S & I Truck or 
under the circumstances should have seen the truck. 
There 'vas no emergency situation here pleaded or 
proved and appellant was entitled to argue the lavv of 
proximate cause as contained in requested instruction 
Number Two. 
The circumstances at the time Schweitzer came 
over the hill have been previously indicated but will be 
amplified here. Looking at Ex H-16, taken 200 feet 
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fron1 the starting point of the survey, the scene of the 
accident is clearly visible. The pickup, a light colored 
one, was sitting broadside in the road at 1100 feet (Ex. 
H-13) or 900 feet away. Schweitzer was traveling at 
45-50 m.p.h., or 70 feet per second. The lights facing 
him were on dim, and \vere on the far side of the road, 
not in the next lane. The lights were stationary, and the 
turn blinkers were on. Schweitzer did not attempt to 
slow down, or bring his car down to a speed he could 
control. He continued do\vn the road until past the 
lights, at which time he recognized the danger and ap-
plied his brakes. 
According to Sheffey's testimony, his truck was 
400 or 500 feet east of Stone's; if this be accepted then 
Schweitzer had available from Sheffey's truck over 
double the distance required to stop at 50 m.p.h., the 
legal speed llimit and the speed he testified he was driv-
ing. (Utah Highway Patrol data, published in Walker 
v. Peterson, 278 P 2nd 291). 
If Sheffey's testimony in this respect is disregarded, 
the fact finder n1ust find that Sheffey's truck was at 
least 178 feet in front of the wreck ( 123 f.eet skid marks 
plus 55 feet reaction tin1:e at 70 feet per second.) If 
Schweitzer "·as going 50 m.p.h. he could stop in a total 
of 183 feet (Walker v. Peterson, Supra) and one look 
at Ex H-6 will show that the Schweitzer car was travel-
ing at a considerable rate of speed when it hit the 
wrecked trucks. 
The only conclusion frorn this is that Schweitzer 
was traveling at least 50 rn.p.h. \Vhen he \Vent past the 
Sheffy truck, and had not slowed do\vn or taken any 
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precaution because of the light~ blinding hin1. In fact, 
the physical evidence would seem to show a speed far 
in excess of 50 m.p.h. However, if Schweitzer had slowed 
appreciably as he passed the Sheffy Truck, he would 
have been able to stop prior to the trucks. 
A person passing a vehicle and blinded by its lights 
is required to use a higher degree of care than normal. 
Fretz v. Anderson, 5 U. 2nd 290, 300 P. 2nd 642. If the 
Sheffy truck was close to the Stone Truck (i. e., within 
200 feet), Schweitzer had over 700 f:eet of highway with 
full view of Sheffy's parked truck and blinkers, in 
which to decrease speed (as was done in the Fretz case). 
rrhe physical facts and Schweitzer's testimony shows 
'vithout conflict that Schweitzer did not slow his car, 
and blindly 'vent past the Sheffy Truck at at least 
50 1n.p.h. 
LT nder these circumstances, Schweitzer was clearly 
guilty of negligence as a 1natter of law, since teasonable 
Inen could not find that he acted with the required 
degree of care. 
Under this evidence appellant's requested instruc-
tion Number Four was proper and the failure to so in-
struct the jury was error prejudicial to appellant. Ap-
pellant was entitled to argue proxin1ate cause to the jury 
in light of Sheffy's testimony, which would place 
Schweitzer 400 to 500 feet away fron1 the wreck with 
unobstruct:ed vision and under circumstances such that 
he must have seen it in time to avoid it. 
.POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN" ~l"I-IE FORl\I 
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OF THE QUESTIONS IN THE SPECIAL VERDICT 
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY. 
It was claimed by respondent and by Higgenbotlian1, 
Sullivan and Western Auto Traansport Company, that 
the S & I vehicle driven by Stone had neither lights nor 
flares about it prior to the collision with the. \Vestern 
Auto Transport Truck. The evidence was in conflict 
as to lights on the truck, and so this was of course a jury 
question. It was also clain1ed that Stone was negligent 
by allowing the truck to run out of gas, and in failing 
to remove it from the traveled portion of the highway. 
To resolve these questions, the court submitted a special 
verdict. The first question on the special verdict was : 
(R-90). 
I(A) Was Harvey Stone negligent by allowing the 
gasolin:e of one tank to become exhausted before switch-
ing to the a uxillary gasoline tank~ 
I(B) Was Harvey Stone negligent in failing tq 
remove the S & I Truck from the travelled portion of 
the highway~ 
I (C) Was Harvey Stone negligent in failing to have 
lights on or flares about the S & I Truck imn1:ediately 
prior to the collision between the t\vo trucks~ 
The vice apparent in these questions is that the 
matter sub1nitted to the jury is not whether Stone did 
or did not do a certain act, but u,hether he was negligent 
in so doing. A very similar verdict was considered by 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Johnston 1). Eschrich, 
57 N.W. 2nd 396. In that case the clai1n \Vas 1nade that 
Eschri eh had driven his truck \vith the tail lights ob-
10 
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scurred. The trial court sub1nitted this interrogatory 
to the jury: 
''Question One" 
"Was the defendant, Wn1. Eschrich, negligent at 
the time and place and under the circumstances existing 
and just prior to the ti1ne of the accident with respect 
to: 
(A) Transporting the load on his truck in such a 
1nanner so as to obscure the tail light~ 
(B) Not having the said truck equuipp:ed with 
proper reflectors-" 
In passing on this interrogatory the Supren1e Court 
said: 
"At the very best, the question is confusing, 
apparently asking the jury to decide whether it 
was negligence for the defendant to transport a 
load in such a manner as to obscure a tail light, 
a question to which the statute gives an affirnla-
tive answer. The question should be fran1ed so 
that the jury may say whether the required light 
was present and visibl:e and the question of 
negligence would take care of itself. There is 
no room in the question submitted for the jury 
to answer that the tail light was visible before 
the collision, if they believed that to be the fact, 
although that is an issue to be determined. We 
consider that the question submitted is so sub-
ject to misinterpretation by the jur~v that a ne\v 
trial must be had in which the respective causal 
negligences of the parties may be determined by 
answers to questions properly fran1ed." 
We sub1nit that despite the cautionary instructions, 
11 
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the form of the interrogatories is confusing, and in 
effect tells the jury that a particular act was or was not 
done, leaving only for the jury the question of 'vhether 
or not such action was negligence. 
POINT IV. 
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT COMMITTED 
ERROR IN PRESE~NTING A J\IATHEMATICAL 
PER DIEM FORJVIULA TO THE JURY. 
During his closing argument to the jury respond-
ent's counsel made reference to and argued from a 
dollar value mathematical con1putation of damages. 
In this connection, he was allowed to use Ex 0-31 in his 
argument. Appellant objected to both the exhibit and 
the nature of the argument (Tr. 370) but the trial 
court perinitted it as proper for the jury's consider-
ation. 
Ex 0-31 contains the following: 
Dee Hospital 
Doctor Bills 
l\Iiscellaneous 
Practical Nursing 
147 
100-8 1176.00 
Past Pain and Suffering 10.00 
921 
Life Expectancy 41 x 365 
Pern1anent Disability at 1.00 
15%-5% 
Future l\1edical 
Future Pain 
12 
1335.00 
835.00 
164.00 
9210.00 
14,965.00 
1000.00 
5000.00 
33690.00 
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14..,ront Ex. 0-31, respondent's counsel argued that 
a reasonable surn for the pain and suffering endured by 
plaintiff fro1n the date of accident to the date of th·e 
trial was $10.00 per day. Since 921 days had elapsed, 
this gave the figure of $9210.00 shown on the exhibit. 
He also argued that future disability was worth $1.00 
per day for her retnaining lif!e expectancy of 14,965 
days for a sum of $14,965.00. 
Appellant's objection to this line of argu1nent was 
based on the holdings of Botta v. Brunner, 138 A 2d 
713, 60 ALR 2nd 1331, and the other cases supporting 
the position that this constitutes improper argument. 
Since these cases and authorities were considered by 
this court in Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance 
Contpany, No. 9179, in the Supreme Court of Utah, we 
\vill not herein cite then1. 
Under the holding of the Olsen cas•e, as we read it, 
such argurnent rnay be proper in the sound discretion 
of the trial court, provided a cautionary instruction is 
given to the effect that the cornputation is argument 
and nothing els•e. In our case, only two instructions were 
given that could in any way be construed as cautionary 
on this point. 
Instruction Nu1nber Four (R-71) provided in part, 
HYou n1ust not consider nor be influenced by any state-
ment of counsel as to 'vha t the evidence is or as to 
what the facts are except \vhere such statement \Vas 
made as an admission or stipulation on behalf of a party 
to the action, unless such state1nent is sho,vn by the 
evidence in the case to be correct." 
13 
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And Instruction Number 19 (R-84) provides in 
part "Ther•e is no definite formula known to the law 
by which the jury can with exactness ascertain what 
would be reasonable compensation for pain and suffer-
ing, but it is left to the sound judg1nent and discretion 
of the jury trying the case to det:errnine what would 
b f . " e a1r ... 
Both of these instructions are general ones, In-
struction Number Four as to the jury being sole judges 
of fact, and Number Nineteen a tvvo page general in-
struction on damages. Neither instruction calls atten-
tion to the computation used on Ex. 0-31, and at no 
time did the court in any way caution the jury to regard 
Ex. 0-31 as only "lawyer talk", not evidence. 
Ex. 0-31 has three items for future; $1.00 per day 
for future disability, $1000.00 for future medicals and 
$5000.00 for future pain. There is certainly an over-
lapping here, that is, some of the disability is due to the 
pain and should be considered as one item, not two. 
Also, it is interesting to note that plaintiff's Ex. 0-31 
showed $33,690.00, and the verdict was for $23,000.00. 
We think this shows the jury paid undue attention to 
this exhibit in their deliberations. 
Under the holding of the Olsen case, we submit,. 
that with no cautionary instruction given it was an 
abuse of discretion and prejudicial to appellant to per-
mit counsel to argue the per diem co1nputation sho,vn 
on Ex. 0-31. 
14 
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v. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the 
trial court should be reversed and r:emanded to the 
trial court for a new trial. 
Respectfully suhrnitted, 
HOWELL, STINE AND OLJ\1STEAD 
RICHAR.D W. CA~fPBELL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
15 
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